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INHIBITORY CONTROL & HYPNOSIS  
Abstract 
Executive functioning is paramount to the successful exertion of inhibitory control over 
automatic impulses and desires.  Despite disagreements in determining the exact mechanisms 
responsible for hypnosis, many theories involve the use of, or alterations in, frontal 
processing and top-down executive functioning.  The present study sought to explore this 
relationship by examining whether a transient state of reduced inhibitory control influences 
susceptibility to hypnosis.  Specifically, participants completed a colour naming task 
designed to place differing demands on inhibitory control processes before experiencing a 
hypnotic induction and four suggestions.  Bayesian analysis indicated substantial evidence 
that the prior exertion of inhibitory control processes does not influence subsequent 
susceptibility to hypnotic suggestion.  The study provides evidence that inhibitory 
impairment, often experienced by those with a range of disorders (such as anxiety and 
depression), should not affect receptiveness to hypnotic procedures.  
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Hypnosis refers to two related concepts: A putative altered state of consciousness in which an 
individual is receptive and attentive to suggestions  (Elkins, Barabasz, Council, & Spiegel, 
2015); and a way of responding to suggestions involving distortions in the sense of 
voluntariness and of reality (Kihlstrom, 2008; APA, 2003).  Hypnotic response may be 
facilitated by a hypnotic state, but it need not be: the two concepts are in principle empirically 
distinguishable (Kirsch, 2011).  Hypnosis has been linked to changes in frontal executive 
functioning (e.g. Egner & Raz, 2007), processes which have previously been reported to be 
implicated following the application of inhibitory control (see Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & 
Chatzisarantis, 2010, for a meta-analysis).  Furthermore, hypofrontality, defined as a state of 
reduced blood flow to the prefrontal cortex and decreased executive functioning often 
associated with neurological conditions such as schizophrenia and depression (see Franzen & 
Ingvar, 1975), has been linked to altered states in general (Dietrich, 2003).  This paper will 
explore whether a transient state of reduced inhibitory functioning influences hypnotic 
responding.  
Hypnotic suggestibility is measured via responses to standard scales of hypnotic 
susceptibility, such as the Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility (HGSHS; Shor & 
Orne, 1962) and the Waterloo Stanford Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility (WSGC; 
Bowers, 1993), usually involving a hypnotic induction procedure followed by a series of 
suggestions.  Susceptibility varies greatly with around 70-80% of the population being 
moderately susceptible to suggestion (referred to as ‘medium’ responders), 10-15% 
responding to few or no suggestions (‘lows’) and the remaining 10-15% responding to most 
or all suggestions (‘highs’), (Woody, Barnier, & McConkey, 2005).  Whilst hypnotic 
suggestibility is thought to be influenced by modifiable factors such as expectancy (Kirsch & 
Lynn, 1997), test-retest reliability of an individual’s hypnotic suggestibility has been reported 
to remain stable over twenty-five to thirty years (Piccione, Hilgard, & Zimbardo, 1989). 
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The best theoretical account of hypnosis remains unresolved.  Whilst some suggest 
that hypnosis stems from an altered state of consciousness (e.g. Bowers, 1992; Hilgard, 1977; 
Woody & Bowers, 1994), often referred to as ‘state-theories’, others maintain that hypnosis 
requires no special state (e.g. Spanos & Coe, 1992; Spanos, 1986). 
Dissociation state models of hypnosis, such as the Neo-dissociation (Hilgard, 1977) 
and dissociated control (Bowers, 1992; Woody & Bowers, 1994) theories, regard hypnotic 
responding as based on a state of separation of normal cognitive control systems.  The Neo-
dissociation theory holds that hypnotic phenomenon come about through a dissociation of 
high level executive control systems, resulting in distorted motor control, perception, and 
memory (Hilgard, 1977).  Specifically, it is proposed that hypnotic inductions split the central 
executive functioning into different streams.  One stream continues to function normally but 
due to an amnesic barrier is not consciously accessible, meaning that the hypnotised 
individual is aware of the resulting action but not of the process eliciting it.   
The dissociated control theory (Bowers, 1992; Woody & Bowers, 1994) explains 
hypnotic responding as a state of dissociation between the supervisory attentional system and 
the contention scheduling system.  As these systems cease to work together efficiently it 
results in diminished frontal supervisory attentional control.  This dissociation between high 
level control systems results in a reliance on automatic, low-level, control system processing 
and thus the feeling of involuntariness which accompanies hypnosis.  If hypnosis is due to 
dissociation, then levels of hypnotic responding should plausibly, positively correlate with 
dissociative experiences.  Research has provided evidence for a relationship between 
dissociative tendencies and hypnotic suggestibility, demonstrating that for highly suggestible 
individuals, dissociative tendencies alter the influence of hypnosis on cognitive control 
(Terhune, Cardeña, & Lindgren, 2011).  However, research to date has been inconclusive 
with evidence both of (Kirsch & Council, 1992; Nadon, Hoyt, Register, & Kihlstrom, 1991; 
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Terhune, Cardeña, Lindgren, Terhune, & Carden, 2011) and a lack of (Butler & Bryant, 
1997; Dienes et al., 2009) a relationship between everyday dissociative experiences and 
hypnotic responding. 
Alternative non-state models of hypnosis include Spanos' (1986) socio-cognitive 
theory which takes the social-psychological perspective that participants’ views of hypnosis 
will affect the degree to which they respond.  That is, rather than holding dissociative 
processes at the forefront of hypnosis, the socio-cognitive approach explains responding in 
terms of misattributions of experience, and as stemming from strategically responding to 
demand characteristics and schematic knowledge of what is expected to happen during the 
hypnotic experience (Spanos & Coe, 1992).  For example, a positive hallucination 
(perceiving something that is not there) could be produced by imagining the stimulus and 
misattributing the act to hypnosis rather than oneself; a negative hallucination (not perceiving 
something that is there) could be produced by deliberately ignoring the stimulus without 
realising one is doing so.  Support for the socio-cognitive approach comes from studies 
reporting that individuals’ motivation, expectancy, and beliefs predict their hypnotic 
suggestibility (Kirsch & Lynn, 1997; Spanos, Brett, Menary, & Cross, 1987).  According to 
Kirsch's (1985) response expectancy version of this theory, the single mediating variable is 
expectancy, which directly causes the hypnotic response (just as expectancy can directly 
cause pain relief in the placebo response). 
The cold control theory (Dienes & Perner, 2007) draws on both the socio-cognitive 
and dissociation approaches to explain hypnotic responding.  According to cold control 
theory, the distinctive nature of hypnotic responding is entirely metacognitive: A strategic 
failure to develop a higher order thought (HOT) that one is intending.  That is, there is a lack 
of awareness of the intention to act and consequently, the act is experienced as involuntary.  
See Norman, Scott, Price, and Dienes (2016), for a demonstration of similar strategic control 
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in the absence of conscious awareness.  From this perspective, both Spanos' (1986) non-state 
and Hilgard's (1977) state theories can be regarded as variants of cold control, because in 
each case there is an intention to act the subject is not aware of.  Conversely, the state 
dissociated control theory of Woody and Bowers (1994) is not a cold control theory, because 
hypnotic response is regarded as occurring without executive intentions; and similarly, for 
Kirsch’s (1985) non-state response expectancy theory: Expectancies, not intentions, cause 
responses. 
Despite disagreements surrounding the mechanisms underlying hypnotic responding, 
many theories involve the use of, or alterations in, frontal processing and top-down cognitive 
control.  Hilgard’s (1977) and Spanos’ (1986) theories require hypnotic suggestions be 
carried out by executive functions; thus, disruptions to executive processes should impair 
hypnotic response.  Conversely, the dissociated control theory of Woody and Bowers (1994) 
likens the hypnotic state to a “functional prefrontal lobotomy” whereby disruptions to 
executive function should enhance hypnotic response.  As Kirsch’s (1985) response 
expectancy theory holds expectancy as the sole factor underlying hypnotic responding, it 
should not obviously predict any change in hypnotic response resulting from disruption to 
frontal function (cf. Buhle, Stevens, Friedman, & Wager, 2012, for independence of placebo 
effects from distraction).  However, expectancy itself has been related to executive function 
(see Schjoedt, Stødkilde-jørgensen, Geertz, Lund, & Roepstorff, 2011), thus any disruption to 
frontal function could impair expectancy and hypnotic response.  According to the cold 
control theory of Dienes and Perner (2007), if disruptions to frontal function impair the 
ability for accurate metacognition, hypnotic response should be facilitated.  That is, if it is 
harder to form accurate higher order thoughts of intending, it will be easier to have inaccurate 
higher order thoughts when required for hypnosis.  However, if frontal function is disrupted 
without affecting metacognition, then hypnotic response will be unaffected unless there is a 
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diminished capacity to carry out the behavioral or cognitive act required (e.g. impaired 
imagining, or ignoring a stimulus in the case of positive or negative hallucinations) in which 
case hypnotic response will be impaired.  
There are clinical reasons for postulating a relation between executive function and 
hypnotic response.  Executive functioning is paramount to successful self-regulation, and in 
exhibiting inhibitory control over automatic impulses and desires.  Hypnosis is applied as a 
valuable tool used to control undesirable behaviours such as in the cessation of smoking 
(Elkins, Marcus, Bates, Rajab, & Cook, 2006; Green & Lynn, 2000, 2017).  Neuroimaging 
research has provided support for postulating a relation of hypnotic response to frontal 
function by pinpointing structures involved in top-down regulation (Gazzaley & D’esposito, 
2007; Miller & Cohen, 2001) which are consistently implicated in hypnotic responding, such 
as the frontal and parietal cortices and the anterior cingulate (Cojan et al., 2009; Dienes & 
Hutton, 2013; Huber, Lui, Duzzi, Pagnoni, & Porro, 2014; McGeown, Mazzoni, Venneri, & 
Kirsch, 2009).  Dienes and Hutton (2013) applied repetitive TMS to the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), many functions of which such as, logic, willed action, and 
memory are particularly affected by hypnosis (Dietrich, 2003), and reported that disrupting 
the DLPFC increased hypnotic responding (cf. Coltheart et al., 2018) .  Similarly, Semmens-
wheeler, Dienes, and Duka (2013) found that alcohol intoxication facilitated hypnotic 
response.  
On the other hand (consistent with Hilgard, 1977, and Spanos, 1986), there is 
evidence to suggest that cognitive demands created by a secondary task can hamper hypnotic 
responding (Kirsch, Burgess, & Braffman, 1999).  Kirsch et al. (1999) report that cognitive 
load from an additional task compromised the subjective experience of suggestions such as 
feelings of rigidity during the rigid arm suggestion.  Furthermore, non-hypnotic tasks appear 
to interfere with responses to posthypnotic suggestions even when the necessary responses do 
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not conflict (e.g. Tobis & Kihlstrom, 2010).  Secondary tasks may impair hypnotic 
responding because hypnotic response requires executive performance of the required 
actions, such as control of attention.  Nonetheless, the results contrast with the interventions 
above that facilitate hypnotic response. 
In terms of the effect of hypnotic induction on executive function tasks, studies have 
shown impaired performance (exhibited by longer reaction times) on a colour-naming Stroop 
task following hypnotic induction, in comparison to non-hypnotised controls (Jamieson & 
Sheehan, 2004; Sheehan, Donovan, & MacLeod, 1988).  Jamieson and Sheehan (2004) 
suggest that this difference in reaction times on the Stroop task is not due to the response 
selection process itself being altered under hypnotic induction, but rather the efficiency (or 
speed) of such processes.  Thus, there is some evidence that hypnotic inductions impair 
executive ability.  One explanation for this might be the requirement of executive control 
processes in order to maintain the altered state itself.  However, Jamieson and Sheehan 
explain such impairments by proposing a modification to dissociative control theory centered 
around the lDLPFC (left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex).  Under normal conditions, the 
lDLPFC would implement control over the feedback monitoring processes of the ACC 
(anterior cingulate cortex).  Jamieson and Sheehan suggest that impaired stroop performance 
during hypnosis is due to a dissociation between the executive control functioning of the 
lDLPFC and the feedback monitoring processes of the ACC (anterior cingulate cortex), 
leading to impaired responses on executive function tasks such as the Stroop.  
In terms the relationship between hypnotic response and executive ability, Dienes et 
al. (2009) found little correlation between hypnotic suggestibility and performance on 
inhibitory attention tasks; and despite initial promising findings reviewed by Crawford, 
Brown, and Moon (1993), later Varga, Németh, and Szekely (2011), and Jamieson and 
Sheehan (2002), failed to find correlations between various attentional tasks and 
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hypnotisability.  Further, Martin, Sackur, and Dienes (2017) showed that one task 
(perspective switching), previously argued to show differences in attentional abilities 
between high and low hypnotizable subjects, is sensitive to demand characteristics and 
motivation differences between high and low hypnotizable subjects.  In sum, despite the 
effects of interventions influencing hypnotic response, individual differences in executive 
ability seems unrelated to hypnotisability (see Parris, 2017). 
One way to reconcile these findings is to postulate that executive resources are needed 
for the normal behavioural and cognitive acts involved in hypnotic response: Imagination, 
attentional control, or appropriate action control.  These acts do not lose the resources needed 
for their completion just because they are hypnotic (Dienes & Perner, 2007).  Thus, major 
attention demanding secondary tasks interfere with hypnotic response.  Yet special attentional 
abilities are not needed to perform these everyday acts:  hence the lack of correlation of 
attentional tasks with hypnotisability.  On the other hand, if sufficient resources are available 
to perform the motor or cognitive act, impairing metacognition will enhance hypnotic 
response (Dienes, 2012).  Thus, rTMS to areas shown to be relevant to metacognition, such 
as the DLPFC (Dienes & Hutton, 2013) and alcohol which prominently affects the DLPFC 
(Semmens-wheeler et al., 2013) may be especially likely to facilitate hypnotic response.  
Testing this theoretical resolution requires interventions that impair executive function 
without harming metacognition.   
One potential intervention which meets both of these requirements involves inhibitory 
tasks commonly employed in the self-control literature.  An extensive body of research has 
previously claimed that applying control on an initial task has a negative impact on an 
individuals’ subsequent ability to control impulses, urges and behaviours (cf. Dang, 2017; 
Hagger et al., 2010, with Carter & McCullough, 2014).  Such research has reported increased 
risk taking (Fischer et al., 2012), over-eating (Hofmann, Rauch, & Gawronski, 2007; Vohs & 
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Heatherton, 2000), and heightened aggression (DeWall, Baumeister, Stillman, & Gailliot, 
2007) following a prior task requiring high levels of self-control, such as the colour naming 
Stroop task.  Similarly, Wheeler, Briñol, and Hermann (2007), found that the prior use of 
inhibitory control decreased subsequent resistance to persuasion.  Popular models designed to 
explain such findings hold that the inability to control behaviours following previous attempts 
at control stem from either diminishing resources needed to exert self-control (the resource 
model; Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998), a change in motivation shifting 
attention away from the need for control and toward rewards (the process model; Muraven & 
Slessareva, 2003), or from the reallocation of computational mechanisms to a more beneficial 
task (the opportunity cost model; Kurzban, Duckworth, Kable, & Myers, 2013).  The 
overarching principle of self-control research is that providing the task is mentally 
exhausting, then subsequent exertion of self-control will be implicated.  When the cognitive 
capacity for control is unavailable, behaviour is instead driven by bottom up processing, 
impulses, and implicit response tendencies (Bertrams et al., 2015; Hofmann et al., 2007).  An 
issue is ensuring a given task is demanding enough: While one task designed to tax self-
control failed to impair subsequent self-control in a large-scale replication (Hagger et al., 
2016), a pre-registered study using the Stroop task found subsequent self-control impairments 
(Dang et al., 2017).  The latter study used rated fatigue as an outcome-neutral check on the 
effectiveness of the Stroop task.  
The question arises as to what effect taxing inhibitory control would have in hypnotic 
response; and it is interesting to consider what the various theories of hypnosis would predict.  
The state dissociated control theory of Woody and Bowers (1994), which compares hypnotic 
responding to a prefrontal lobotomy, would predict an increase in hypnotic response 
following a taxing inhibitory task as this disruption to executive function will facilitate 
hypnosis.  Conversely, Hilgard's (1977) and Spanos' (1986) theories require executive 
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functioning to perform hypnotic suggestions.  Thus, if inhibitory control tasks temporarily 
impair executive ability, then Hilgard’s and Spanos’ theories would predict a decrease in 
subsequent susceptibility following a taxing inhibitory task.   Kirsch's (1985) theory views 
expectancy as the sole predictor of hypnotic response and thus would predict either no effect 
of inhibitory control tasks on subsequent susceptibility or an impaired hypnotic response if 
expectancies rely on successful executive function (see Schjoedt et al., 2011).  The 
predictions of cold control theory (Dienes, 2012; Dienes & Perner, 2007) depend on the 
effect of inhibitory challenge on metacognition.  Previous research has linked metacognition 
and the lDLPFC (see Dienes & Hutton, 2013) suggesting that implicating the lDLPFC 
disrupts metacognition and increases hypnotic suggestibility.  The Stroop task employed here 
as the inhibitory manipulation has also been linked to the lDLPFC (see Macleod & 
Macdonald, 2000; Vanderhasselt, De Raedt, & Baeken, 2009).  However, the left DLPFC is a 
large area and previous research (Gurney, Lagos, Manning, & Scott 2017) has showed that 
the inhibitory challenge used here (the Stroop) did not affect subjective thresholds in a 
subliminal perception task1; thus, the formation of accurate higher-order thoughts was not 
affected.  As such, cold control theory predicts that inhibitory challenge would have no effect 
on hypnotic response unless there is an impairment in the capacity to carry out the cognitive 
or behavioural act required for the suggestions, in which case responding would be impaired.  
Here we tested whether a prior inhibitory challenge would change suggestibility to a 
set of standard hypnotic suggestions.  Specifically, we manipulated inhibitory control 
processes via the completion of either an easy or difficult version of the colour classification 
Stroop task (cf. Dang et al., 2017).  Our outcome neutral test was rated mental exhaustion (cf. 
Dang et al., 2017).  We then examined participants’ responsiveness to a hypnotic induction 
                                                          
1 Whilst this is not reported in Gurney et al. (2017), the results show substantial evidence of no difference in 
subjective thresholds between the difficult and easy inhibitory task conditions, (Mdiff = 6.96, SEdiff = 5.56), t(116) 
= -1.25, p = .213, dz = 0.23, BN(0, 50.10)  = 0.24 RR[39.37,100], Note. here the Bayes was modelled as a normal 
distribution from 0 to halfway between the control mean and the bottom of the scale. 
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procedure and four standard suggestions including ‘magnetic hands’, ‘rigid arm’, and a taste 
and negative colour illusion.  Adopting the stance of the cold control theory, we predicted 
that prior inhibitory control would not affect hypnotic response or would impair it only if the 
processes required for responses were similarly impaired (i.e. impaired motor response 




60 participants (45 female, 15 male) aged 18 to 44 years (M = 20.70, SD = 3.57) were 
recruited from the University of Sussex Hypnosis Database and paid £5 for participation.  
Participants had previously been screened using the Waterloo Stanford Group Scale of 
Hypnotic suggestibility (Form C, Bowers, 1993) and had been rated as 'medium responders' 
(between 5 to 8 out of 12) for hypnotic suggestibility.  Participants were randomly assigned 
in equal proportions to one of two experimental task type conditions: difficult versus easy 
inhibitory challenge.  All participants were naive to the experimental hypothesis.  The 
experiment was considered low risk and received ethical approval from the University of 
Sussex School of Psychology ethics committee.  All participants read an information sheet 
and signed a consent form before the experiment began.  At the end of the experiment 
participants were fully debriefed as to the nature of the experimental aims. 
Materials 
The experiment was implemented in Matlab and run Pavilion DM4 computer with a 
15” 60Hz monitor.  
A standardised hypnotic induction and four hypnotic suggestions were presented to 
participants via headphones.  The four suggestions included "magnetic hands", "rigid arm", a 
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taste hallucination and a negative colour hallucination.  The complete set of materials for 
both experiments, including the scripts for the hypnotic induction and four suggestions, and 
the corresponding data has been made publicly available on the Open Science Framework 
(OSF) and can be retrieved from http://osf.io/xa9p8. 
Mood ratings were captured using a Visual Analogue Scale (VAS) for the emotions: 
happy, sad, anxious, mentally exhausted, aroused and angry, e.g. “At this precise moment 
how HAPPY do you feel?” with ratings provided on a scale from ‘not at all’ (1) to 
‘extremely’ (10).  The mood ratings for the emotions happy, sad, anxious, aroused and angry 
were included in order to ensure that the experimental manipulation itself (inhibitory control 
task; easy vs. difficult) did not unduly alter mood and thus mood did not confound the results.  
For this reason, mood ratings were taken at the outset of the experiment and immediately 
after the inhibitory control task in order to check there was no evidence of a between groups 
difference.  In line with previous research (e.g. Dang, 2017; Vohs et al., 2011) the mood 
rating for exhaustion was included as the manipulation check in order to measure whether the 
inhibitory control task was experienced as more mentally exhausting.  Here, if the inhibitory 
control manipulation was successful, we would expect to find substantial evidence that those 
in the difficult inhibitory control task were more mentally exhausted than those in the easy 
condition. 
In order to measure how susceptible participants expected they would be, a rating of 
expectation was captured for each participant using a VAS, e.g. “how strongly do you think 
you will respond to the hypnotic suggestions?” with ratings provided on a scale from ‘not at 
all’ (1) to ‘very much’ (10).  This score is referred to as ‘expectancy ratings’ in the results 
section.  
Additional VAS were also employed as a measure of self-reported hypnotic 
experience following each suggestion.  Questions for these VAS included "To what extent 
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did your hands move together?", "To what extent did you find it difficult to bend your arm?", 
and "To what extent did you experience a taste in your mouth?" rated from "Not at all" to 
"Very much" and lastly, "What proportion of the block pattern did you perceive as being 
grey?" rated from "None at all" to "The entire pattern". 
Two versions of the colour-naming Stroop task, previously shown to be among the 
stronger manipulations in ego-depletion studies (Hagger et al., 2010), were used as the 
inhibitory-control manipulation, see Procedure section.  
The Self-Control Scale (SCS; Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004), was included as 
a measure of self-reported trait self-control.  The Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES; 
Bernstein & Putnam, 1986), was included as a self-report measure of dissociative 
experiences.  This was included in order to examine the relationship between dissociation and 
hypnotic responding in the context of a hypnosis study.  Lastly, the Five Facet Mindfulness 
Questionnaire (FFMQ; Baer, Smith, Hopkins, & Toney, 2006), was used as a self-report 
measure of five facets of mindfulness including, observing, describing, acting with 
awareness, non-judging, and non-reactivity.  This was included to examine any relationship 
between mindfulness and hypnotic suggestibility as previous research has reported a negative 
correlation between mindfulness and hypnotic response (Lush, Naish, & Dienes 2016).   
Three further questions were included as a debrief in order to ensure that participants 
were naïve to the experimental hypothesis.  These included “What do you think the 
experiment was trying to test?”, “What do you think was the purpose of the colour 
classification task?”, and “How do you think being mentally exhausted would affect your 
hypnotic suggestibility?”.  
Design 
The experiment adopted a between subjects design with one independent variable: 
Inhibitory control manipulation (easy vs. difficult).  The primary dependent variable was the 
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hypnotic experience ratings taken after each hypnotic suggestion.  VAS ratings of mood and 
mental exhaustion were used as outcome neutral manipulation checks (with changes in 
mental exhaustion but not mood desired); expectation, and personality measures (SCS, 
FFMQ, DES) were also captured for correlational analyses.  
Procedure 
The experiment was conducted in a quiet room with the experimenter available 
throughout.  Instructions were presented on screen and clarification was provided by the 
experimenter if required.  The experiment began with a sound check allowing participants to 
set a comfortable volume for the audio instructions.  Participants then provided demographic 
information (e.g. age and gender) before instructions for the inhibitory control manipulation 
were provided.  
Inhibitory control manipulation.  Participants completed one of two versions of the 
colour naming Stroop task (easy vs. difficult).  Those in the difficult inhibitory challenge 
condition completed a four-colour version requiring high levels of inhibition of responses to 
suppress the automatic tendency to read the word in order to report the colour of the text that 
it is written in (either Red, Green, Blue or Yellow).  For example, ‘red’ written in blue must 
be classified as blue and not red. Participants were asked to be as accurate as possible.  Trials 
began with a 300ms fixation cross before the colour word was presented for 1000ms in 
‘Arial’ font size 50.  Participants classified the text colour using keys 1-4.  Failure to respond 
within 1 second or to correctly classify the colour resulted in a middle C pitch error tone.  
There were 240 trials in total with every 8 trials containing 2 trials of each colour word in a 
randomised order.  Each set of 8 trials also contained 6 congruent trials (colour name and text 
colour match) and 2 incongruent trials (colour name and text colour did not match).  
Those in the easy condition completed a two-colour version of the colour 
classification task, requiring lower levels of inhibitory responses, in which the colour of the 
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text and the word presented were always congruent (i.e. ‘red’ written in red) and were only 
either red or green.  Participants were again asked to keep errors to a minimum.  Responses 
were made using keys 1-2.  Each trial began the same way as the four-colour Stroop task but 
they were asked to classify the text colour as either Red or Green using keys ‘1’ or ‘2’ 
respectively.  The duration of the task was fixed to match the duration of the inhibitory 
condition, irrespective of the number of trials completed.   
Mood ratings.  Following the inhibitory manipulation, a set of mood ratings were 
captured using the on-screen VAS for the emotions: happy, sad, anxious, aroused, angry, and 
exhausted e.g. “At this precise moment how happy do you feel?”  with ratings provided on a 
scale from ‘not at all’ (0) to ‘extremely’ (10).   
Expectation rating.  An additional VAS was then employed to capture a measure of 
how participants expected they would respond to hypnotic suggestion.    
Hypnotic responding.  All participants were instructed to put on their headphones 
and were asked to listen to the standardised hypnotic induction procedure.  This induction 
was followed by the four separate suggestions in the following order: hands together, rigid 
arm, taste hallucination, and negative colour hallucination.  After each suggestion participants 
were prompted to give a measure of self-reported hypnotic responding.  Responses for the 
hands together, rigid arm, and taste hallucination suggestions were made using on-screen 
VAS for the questions; “To what extent did your hands move together?”, “To what extent did 
you find it difficult to bend your arm?” and “To what extent did you experience a taste in 
your mouth?” respectively, with the scale ranging from “not at all” (0) to “very much” (10).  
Responses to the negative colour hallucination was measured using a VAS for the question 
“What proportion of the block pattern did you perceive as being grey?” from “none at all” (0) 
to “the entire pattern” (10).   
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Questionnaires.  Participants then completed three on-screen questionnaires; the 
SCS, DES and FFMQ.  
Lastly, participants were asked to answer the three on-screen debrief questions before 
being fully debriefed as to the true nature of the study and thanked for their participation.  
Results 
All raw data are available at http://osf.io/xa9p8.  
Bayes factors (B) were used to assess the strength of evidence for the alternative 
hypothesis, H1, over the null, H0 (Wagenmakers, Verhagen, Ly, Matzke, et al., 2017).  A B 
of above 3 indicates substantial evidence for H1 over H0 and below 1/3 substantial evidence 
for the H0 over Hl.  All Bayes factors, B, reported here represent the evidence for H1 relative 
to H0; to find the evidence for H0 relative to H1, take 1/B.  Bs between 3 and 1/3 indicate 
data insensitivity (see Dienes, 2014; cf. Jeffreys, 1939).  Here, BH(0, x) refers to a Bayes factor 
in which the predictions of H1 were modeled as a half-normal distribution with an SD of x 
(see Dienes & McLatchie, 2017); the half-normal can be used when a theory makes a 
directional prediction where x scales the size of effect that could be expected.  As correlations 
with hypnotic response, if they exist, tend to be in the region of r = 0.2 (e.g. Laurence, 
Beaulieu-Prévost, & Du Chéné, 2008), for correlations the SD was set to be x = 0.2.  For the 
mood ratings, in the absence of similar previous studies we followed a strategy recommended 
by Dienes (2017) for this situation.  As we predicted that the control group would be happier 
and more aroused, as they had not undergone a fatiguing inhibitory control task, we estimated 
a difference between the mean of the experimental condition and the maximum shift possible, 
thus the SD for mood valence and arousal were set as half the difference between the mean of 
the difficult condition and the top of the scale (10) (i.e. 3.45/2 = 1.73).  For the manipulation 
check, using the same strategy would result in modeling H1 with a half-normal with SD = 
2.65.  A previous study (Gurney et al., 2018) using the same difficult and easy tasks and the 
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same measure of mental exhaustion estimated a change of 2.85, virtually the same as the 
estimate just calculated using the Dienes (2017) strategy.  As conclusions do not depend on 
which SD is used; we chose the more informed value (2.85).  Finally, for the change in 
hypnotic response, theoretically the effect could go in either direction, thus we used a normal 
distribution to model H1.  BN(0, x) refers to a Bayes factor in which the predictions of H1 were 
modelled as a normal distribution with a mean of 0 and an SD of x (this can be used for non-
directional predictions in general).  The maximum difference between the groups is the 
largest difference between the control mean and the end of the scale.  We then set the SD to 
be half this maximum.  The effect observed in the control condition of Experiment 1 was 4.51 
on a 10-point scale, thus, the SD was set to 2.75.  With these assumptions for modeling H1, 
as it happened, where an effect yielded a p value of about .05, the Bayes factor was about 3, 
though there is no guarantee of such a correspondence between B and p values (Lindley, 
1957).  We will interpret all effects with respect to the Bayes factors. 
To indicate the robustness of Bayesian conclusions, for each B, a robustness region is 
reported, giving the range of scales that qualitatively support the same conclusion (i.e. 
evidence as insensitive, or as supporting H0, or as supporting H1), notated as: RR [x1, x2] 
where x1 is the smallest SD that gives the same conclusion and x2 is the largest2. 
Participant Awareness 
 Responses to the question “What do you think the experiment was trying to test?” 
which included references to the influence of exhaustion, depletion, will-power (or similar) 
affecting hypnotic suggestibility were coded as ‘aware’.  Responses to the question “What do 
you think the purpose of the colour classification task was?”, which mentioned depletion or 
exhaustion were coded as ‘aware’.  Finally, any responses to the question “How do you think 
being mentally exhausted would affect your hypnotic suggestibility?”, which stated that it 
                                                          
2 Thanks to Balazs Aczel for suggesting the use of robustness regions 
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would increase suggestibility were coded as ‘increase’, those which stated suggestibility 
would decrease were coded as ‘decrease’ and ‘other’ for ambiguous answers.  All responses 
were coded by two independent coders, and codes were found to correspond 100%.  
No participants correctly identified the purpose of the experiment.  Out of the five 
participants who correctly identified the purpose of the stroop task, all thought that mental 
exhaustion would increase suggestibility. 
Correlational Analysis  
Expectancy.  Pearson’s correlation revealed a positive relationship between 
participants’ expectancy ratings (how participants believed they would respond) and their 
mean hypnotic response, r = .28, p = .028, BH(0, 0.20) = 6.08, RR[0.09,0.97]. 
Personality.  Correlational analyses were conducted for the relationship between each 
of the personality measures and mean hypnotic responding, see Table 1.  Results show that 
responses to the DES showed a positive relationship with hypnotic responding. 
 















r -.13 -.03 -.00 -.12 .00 -.20 .35 
p .310 .838 .995 .348 .981 .132 .006 
B 0.31* 0.47 0.55 0.32* 0.55 0.25* 18.63* 
Note. * Sensitive B at >3 or <1/3. 
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Outcome Neutral Tests 
 Exhaustion.  There was no evidence one way or the other for there being a difference 
in mental exhaustion between those in the difficult (M = 5.49, SE = 0.42) and easy (M = 4.69, 
SE = 0.45) conditions, t(58) = 1.31, p = .197, d = 0.34, BH(0, 2.85)  = 0.85 RR[0.00, 8.11]. 
 Thus, we have not established, independent of the crucial test, that the tasks 
challenged the inhibitory system to a different extent.  As well as establishing a difference in 
test difficulty we would also establish that mood was not changed.  Changes in mood may 
accompany different degrees of fatigue as a matter of course, thus establishing no change in 
mood is not crucial to the logic of the experiment in the same way that establishing 
differences in inhibitory challenge is. 
Mood (valence).  There was no evidence one way or the other for there being a 
difference in valence between those in the difficult (M = 3.09, SE = 0.61) and easy (M = 3.69, 
SE = 0.61) conditions, t(58) = 1.31, p = .489, d = 0.18, BH(0, 3.45)  = 0.46 RR[0.00, 4.99]. 
Mood (arousal).  There was no evidence one way or the other for there being a 
difference in arousal between those in the difficult (M = 4.30, SE = 0.37) and easy (M = 4.67, 
SE = 0.38) conditions, t(58) = 0.71, p = .478, d = 0.18, BH(0, 2.85) = 0.46 RR[0.00, 3.15]. 
Main Analysis  
 The effect of a prior inhibitory challenge on hypnotic suggestibility.  Here we 
sought to examine how hypnotic suggestibility differed with inhibitory control condition.  A 
one-way ANOVA was conducted on mean hypnotic response and the inhibitory control 
manipulation condition (easy vs. difficult).  The results revealed evidence for a main effect of 
inhibitory control condition on subsequent hypnotic response, (Mdiff = 1.07, SEdiff = 0.43), 
F(1, 58) = 6.13, p = .016, ηp2 = .10, BN(0, 2.75)  = 3.17 RR[0.39,2.94], with those in the easy 
rather than difficult condition showing a greater hypnotic response, see Figure 1. 
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Discussion 
Experiment 1 aimed to investigate the effect of a prior inhibitory task on subsequent 
susceptibility to hypnotic suggestions.  Consistent with Hilgard (1977) and Spanos (1986) our 
results suggest that a prior inhibitory task decreases subsequent susceptibility.  As such the 
findings contrast predictions from dissociated control theories of hypnosis which suggest that 
due to compromised functioning of the frontal cortices there would be an increase in 
suggestibility to hypnosis.  The positive, correlation between participant’s dissociative 
experiences as reported on the DES and their hypnotic responding provides some support for 
a relationship between dissociative processes and hypnosis.  However, one limitation of the 
inhibitory control literature is ensuring that the task used is mentally exhausting (see Dang, 
2017).  Whilst the Stroop, as used here, has previously been shown to create necessary 
inhibitory demand (Dang, 2017; Gurney et al., 2017) we were unable to provide evidence for 




































Figure 1.  Change in mean hypnotic responding for each hypnotic suggestion as a 
product of inhibitory condition (+/- 1 SEM).  Note. * p < .05 
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conditions.  As we did not have clear evidence for this outcome neutral test, and Experiment 
1 was run without a pre-defined analytic protocol, we sought to directly replicate the 




96 participants (72 female, 24 male) aged 18 to 45 years (M = 20.95, SE = 0.41) were 
‘medium responders’ recruited from the University of Sussex Hypnosis Database and paid £5 
for participation.  Participants were randomly assigned in equal proportions to one of two 
experimental task type conditions created by the inhibitory control manipulation: easy versus 
difficult.  All participants were naive to the experimental hypothesis.  Participants were run 
until the Bayes factor for the manipulation check indicated substantial evidence for either H1 
or H0.  The experiment was considered low risk and received ethical approval from the 
University of Sussex School of Psychology ethics committee.  All participants read an 
information sheet and signed a consent form before the experiment began.  At the end of the 
experiment participants were fully debriefed as to the nature of the experimental aims.  The 
experimental materials, design and procedure all remained the same as Experiment 1. 
Results 
Participant Awareness 
 Responses to the three debrief questions were coded as in Experiment 1.  No 
participants simultaneously identified the purpose of the study, the purpose of the stroop and 
identified that exhaustion would decrease susceptibility.  Therefore, all were included in the 
analysis. 
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Correlational Analysis 
 Expectancy.  Pearson’s correlation revealed a positive relationship between 
participants’ expectancy ratings and their mean hypnotic response, r = .38, p < .001, BH(0, 0.2)  
= 538.22, RR[0.03, 1]. 
Personality.  Correlational analyses were conducted for the relationship between each 
of the personality measures and mean hypnotic responding, see Table 2.  Results show 
evidence that responses to the SCS showed a negative relationship with hypnotic responding 
and the DES showed a positive relationship with hypnotic responding.   
 















r -.21 .01 -.11 -.09 -.14 .02 .33 
p .039 .903 .293 .395 .168 .851 .001 
B 5.06* 0.48 0.24* 0.26* 0.21* 0.52 91.04* 
Note. * Sensitive B at >3 or <1/3. 
Outcome Neutral Tests 
 Exhaustion.  There was substantial evidence for a difference in mental exhaustion 
between those in the difficult (M = 6.26, SE = 0.31) and easy (M = 5.07, SE = 0.38) 
conditions, t(91.74) = -2.45, p = .016, d = 0.50, BH(0, 2.85)  = 5.90, RR[0.27, 6.06]. 
 This is a key manipulation check to establish the integrity of the experiment.  
Establishing equivalence of mood would help narrow theoretical interpretation, but as mood 
may naturally vary with exhaustion (in that, for example, exhaustion is often unpleasant), 
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presence or absence of mood differences do not threaten the integrity of the experiment as 
such. 
Mood (valence).  There was no evidence one way or the other for there being a 
difference in valence between those in the difficult (M = 1.26, SE = 0.57) and easy (M = 2.42, 
SE = 0.47) conditions, t(94) = 1.56, p = .119, d = 0.32, BH(0, 4.37)  = 1.04 RR[0.00, 14.53]. 
Mood (arousal).  There was evidence for the null hypothesis, namely that there was 
no difference in arousal between those in the difficult (M = 4.44, SE = 0.38) and easy (M = 
4.65, SE = 0.31) conditions, t(94) = 0.43, p = .672, d = 0.09, BH(0, 2.78)  = 0.24 RR[2.04, 10].  
Thus, the differences in mental exhaustion were not accompanied by overall differences in 
arousal. 
Main Analysis  
 The effect of a prior inhibitory challenge on hypnotic suggestibility.  Here we 
sought to examine how hypnotic suggestibility differed with inhibitory control condition.  A 
one-way ANOVA was conducted on mean hypnotic response and the inhibitory control 
manipulation (easy vs. difficult).  The results revealed substantial evidence for the null 
hypothesis, namely that there was no main effect of inhibitory control condition on mean 
hypnotic response, (Mdiff = -0.17, SEdiff = 0.38), F (1, 94) = 0.20, p = .675, ηp2 = .00, BN(0, 2.75)  
= 0.15, RR[1.23, 10], see Figure 2. 
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Figure 2.  Change in mean hypnotic responding for each hypnotic suggestion as a product of 
inhibitory condition (+/- 1 SEM).  
Next, we tested whether the crucial effect in Experiment 1 was different from that in 
Experiment 2.  The results showed substantial evidence for an interaction between condition 
and experiment, (Mdiff = 0.81, SEdiff = 0.29), F (1, 152) = 4.52, p = .035, ηp2 = .03, BN(0, 2.75)  = 
4.63, RR[0.01, 4.38], suggesting that the crucial effect was different in the two experiments.  
We also tested whether Experiment 2 replicated the effect in Experiment 1, in the specific 
sense of using the posterior distribution of the effect found from Experiment 1 as the model 
of H1 for testing the effect in Experiment 2 (the strategy recommended by Verhagen & 
Wagenmakers, 2014).  The resulting Bayes provided evidence that Experiment 2 did not 
replicate the effect observed in Experiment 1, BN(0.80,0.39)  = 0.16, RR[1.01, 10].  Finally, we 
meta-analytically combined the raw effect sizes of Experiment 1 and 2 weighting by the 
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and computed a Bayes Factor for the combined effect3.  The resulting Bayes factor provided 
substantial evidence for the null hypothesis, namely that exerting inhibitory control does not 
decrease susceptibility to hypnotic suggestion, BN(0, 2.75)  = 0.23 RR[1.89,10]. 
Discussion 
Experiment 2 sought to establish whether the effect reported in Experiment 1, namely 
that a prior inhibitory task decreases subsequent susceptibility, would be replicated over a 
larger sample size.  Those in the difficult inhibitory task condition gave higher ratings of 
mental exhaustion suggesting that the challenging task had the desired effect of increasing 
inhibitory demand.  We found evidence for no effect relative to a relatively uninformed 
model of H1, and evidence for no effect relative to the effect size found in Experiment 1.  
Combining both studies in a Bayesian meta-analysis provided support for the null hypothesis 
that exerting inhibitory processes on a challenging task has no effect on subsequent 
susceptibility to hypnotic suggestion.  As the outcome neutral test was not satisfied in 
Experiment 1, and the analyses were not pre-defined, we treat Experiment 1 as exploratory 
(even though the analytic protocol was in fact simple); and Experiment 2 as more clearly 
testing the theoretical claim that an inhibitory challenge impairs hypnotic response, given the 
analytic protocol had been pre-defined by that used in Experiment 1. 
Consistent with Experiment 1 and previous research there was a positive correlation 
between scores on the DES in the hypnotic context (Kirsch & Council, 1992; Nadon et al., 
1991).  This correlation may especially arise when hypnotic response and DES are tested in 
the same context (e.g. contrast Dienes et al., 2009, where they were tested in a different 
context).  In addition to this we found a negative relationship between individuals’ scores on 
                                                          
3 This is the same as a fixed effects meta-analysis.  While the difference between experiments is evidence (but 
not strong evidence, B < 10) that the effect is not fixed, on the null hypothesis we are testing the effect is fixed 
at zero. That is, if we assume H0, we assume a fixed effect. Note that the same program exactly was run in the 
same university drawing from the same subject pool (largely psychology undergraduates at the University of 
Sussex) with no obvious contextual differences that would be relevant according to the theories tested. Thus, it 
is relevant to test the model there is one fixed effect of zero. 
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the SCS and their mean hypnotic responding suggesting that those scoring highest in self-
control, reported lower levels of hypnotic responding.  Given this result, it is interesting that 
we did not observe lower levels of hypnotic responding for those who had completed the easy 
task.  This suggests a difference between trait levels of self-control and the level of regulatory 
capacity altered by inhibitory control tasks.  Interestingly, whilst some report a positive 
relationship between trait self-control and the ability to overcome the effects of ‘depletion’ 
(Gillebaart & de Ridder, 2015; Muraven, Collins, Shiffman, & Paty, 2005) others have 
reported the opposite effect (see Imhoff, Schmidt, & Gerstenberg, 2014). 
General Discussion 
 Despite disagreements surrounding the exact mechanisms underlying hypnosis, many 
theories involve the use of, or alterations in, frontal processing and executive functioning 
(e.g. Dietrich, 2003; Egner & Raz, 2007).  As executive functions are vital to inhibitory 
control, the present study sought to examine whether a temporary reduction in inhibitory 
control might influence hypnotic suggestibility.  We sought to address this by manipulating 
the degree of demand required to complete a prior task, which consisted of either an easy or 
difficult colour naming task (see Dang, 2017), and comparing subsequent susceptibility to a 
set of four standard hypnotic suggestions.  
Experiment 1 aimed to investigate the effect of the degree of inhibitory challenge on 
subsequent hypnotic responding.  This constituted an initial exploration.  There was not clear 
evidence for the difference in mental exhaustion produced by the inhibitory tasks in the 
intervention and control conditions; thus, the required outcome neutral task was not passed.  
Nonetheless, the results for Experiment 1 provided evidence for the hypothesis that a prior 
inhibitory task decreases subsequent hypnotic suggestibility.  Crucially, Experiment 2, did 
provide evidence for the outcome neutral task, that is a difference in mental exhaustion 
between the intervention and control groups, and had researchers’ degrees of freedom 
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removed by following the exact protocol as Experiment 1.  Experiment 2 found evidence for 
no effect of prior inhibitory control on hypnotic response.  A Bayesian meta-analysis 
combining the two experiments provided evidence for the null hypothesis that exerting 
inhibitory processes on a challenging task has no effect on subsequent susceptibility to 
hypnotic suggestion.  The results presented here therefore suggest that the level of demand 
we placed on inhibitory processes does not influence the degree to which an individual is 
responsive to subsequent hypnotic influences. 
It may be argued that although we had succeeded in placing different levels of 
inhibitory demand on participants, that difference was not large enough to interfere with 
hypnotic response.  However, the Stroop task used in the experiments in this paper has been 
pinpointed as one of the strongest and most reliable inhibitory control manipulations in a 
recent meta-analysis of the depletion literature (Dang, 2017) and has also been used to show 
subsequently increased stereotype consistent errors (Govorun & Payne, 2006), decreased 
persistence on puzzle-solving tasks (Webb & Sheeran, 2003, Experiment 1), and reduced 
performance on tests of handgrip endurance (Bray, Martin Ginis, Hicks, & Woodgate, 2008).  
Furthermore, it is coupled with a manipulation check in which participants were asked to rate 
how mentally exhausted they are, a method which is common place within the literature (e.g. 
Bray et al., 2008; Fischer et al., 2012; Friese, Binder, Luechinger, Boesiger, & Rasch, 2013; 
Friese, Hofmann, & Wänke, 2008; Friese, Messner, & Schaffner, 2012; Govorun & Payne, 
2006; Grillon, Quispe-Escudero, Mathur, & Ernst, 2015; Webb & Sheeran, 2003). 
The results presented here are consistent with the cold control theory (Dienes, 2012; 
Dienes & Perner, 2007) in that previous work disrupting frontal function that improves 
hypnotic response has been interpreted by cold control as arising from a disruption in 
metacognition.  That is, as cold control predicts an improvement in hypnotic response only 
where metacognition is affected.  Previous research suggests that the inhibitory challenge 
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utilised in the current study (the colour naming Stroop) does not affect the formation of 
accurate higher-order thoughts (Gurney et al., 2018), thus the cold control theory would 
predict no alteration - or an impairment in hypnotic responding if the disruption is sufficient 
to impair the strategies that must be performed to produce the hypnotic action.  What cold 
control theories, including those of Spanos (1986) and Hilgard (1977) rule out is an 
improvement in hypnotic response by disrupting frontal function. 
The positive relationship between expectancy and hypnotic response is consistent 
with Kirsch's (1985) response expectancy theory, which regards belief about ones 
susceptibility as the single direct cause of hypnotic response.  However, expectancy itselfhas 
been linked to executive function (e.g. Schjoedt et al., 2011), thus if executive function (and 
thus expectancy) is disrupted, then hypnotic response could be impaired.  Here we find no 
evidence that prior use of executive processes alters hypnotic response suggesting that 
perhaps expectancy has similarly been unaffected by prior inhibitory control. 
The results do not provide evidence for the original dissociated control theory of 
hypnosis (e.g. Bowers, 1992; Woody & Bowers, 1994) as such approaches would have 
predicted an increase in hypnotic suggestibility following a challenging inhibitory task due to 
an implication of the frontal processes resulting in less control over the further splitting of 
executive control systems.  However, second-order dissociated control models, which locate 
the dissociation in meta-cognitive monitoring, survive the challenge (Woody & Sadler, 
2008).  Further, the positive relationship observed between DES scores and mean hypnotic 
response mirrors findings previously documented (Kirsch & Council, 1992; Nadon et al., 
1991) and provides some evidence of a link between dissociative experiences and hypnotic 
suggestibility, though the absence of this correlation when the measures are taken in different 
contexts suggests caution in using it to support dissociation theories (Dienes et al., 2009; 
Kirsch & Council, 1992).  It should also be noted that this sample employs medium 
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responders only.  If related, dissociation should be observed mostly for highs, thus it is 
interesting that we observe a relationship between DES and responding here.  This might 
suggest that dissociation is linked with hypnotic responding in general rather being limited to 
high responders only.  
Previous research has shown that exerting control on one task reduces the degree of 
control which is readily applied to subsequent tasks (e.g. Baumeister et al., 1998; DeWall et 
al., 2007; Fischer et al., 2012; Hofmann et al., 2007; Vohs & Heatherton, 2000).  Thus, if 
inhibitory control was necessary for hypnosis, the inhibitory control literature would predict 
impaired hypnotic responding following a task which placed high levels of demand on 
inhibitory processes.  This was not observed in the present study and instead the results show 
substantial evidence of no effect of prior inhibitory control on hypnotic response.  However, 
interestingly, we do report a negative correlation between individuals’ trait levels of self-
control and their mean hypnotic responding.  This suggests a difference between trait self-
control and temporary alterations in regulatory capacity induced by the inhibitory control 
manipulation.  Further, the result suggests that those with low trait self-control should be 
more receptive to hypnosis.  This is important given the clinical applications of hypnosis as a 
supplementary therapy in populations associated with chronically impaired self-control.  
Hypnosis is thought to augment the effectiveness of cognitive behavioural therapies 
(Kirsch, Montgomery, & Sapirstein, 1995), decrease the symptoms of anxiety and depression 
(Heap, 2012), and facilitate treatment gains for a variety of psychological and medical 
conditions (see Green, Laurence, & Lynn, 2014, for a review).  Previous work has 
highlighted the role of chronically impaired inhibitory control in disorders such as anxiety 
(Cisler & Koster, 2010; Cisler & Olatunji, 2012) and depression (Joormann & Stanton, 
2016).  Thus, it is interesting and arguably reassuring to report that placing a high level of 
demand on inhibitory control processes had no effect on hypnotic suggestibility.  This 
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encouragingly suggests that, at least within the constraints of study, those with low levels of 
inhibitory control should be no less receptive to the potentially beneficial effects of hypnosis 
as a treatment.  Further, the correlation between low levels of self-control and high hypnotic 
response suggests those individuals with disorders characterised by impaired self-control 
might in fact, be more responsive to the benefits of hypnosis.   
Cold control theory (Dienes & Perner, 2007) would predict a change in hypnotic 
response only where metacognition is impaired.  As previous research has shown substantial 
evidence of no effect of the inhibitory task on subjective thresholds and metacognition 
(Gurney et al., 2017), cold control theory would predict no change in hypnotic response 
between inhibitory task conditions as metacognition should remain unaffected.  As such, the 
results presented here provide support for the cold control theory and provide evidence that 
exerting inhibitory control processes does not influence subsequent susceptibility to hypnotic 
suggestion.  Considering the use of hypnosis in facilitating treatments, it is reassuring that 
prior inhibitory control demand does not unduly effect receptiveness to hypnotic procedures. 
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